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Abstract 
 
Existing asymmetric encryption algorithms require 
the storage of the secret private key. Stored keys are 
often protected by poorly selected user passwords that 
can either be guessed or obtained through brute force 
attacks. This is a weak link in the overall encryption 
system and can potentially compromise the integrity of 
sensitive data. Combining biometrics with 
cryptography is seen as a possible solution but any 
biometric cryptosystem must be able to overcome small 
variations present between different acquisitions of the 
same biometric in order to produce consistent keys. 
This paper discusses a new method which uses an 
entropy based feature extraction process coupled with 
Reed-Solomon error correcting codes that can 
generate deterministic bit-sequences from the output of 
an iterative one-way transform. The technique is 
evaluated using 3D face data and is shown to reliably 
produce keys of suitable length for 128-bit Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES). 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Communications advancements in recent decades 
have led to an increased volume of digital data 
traveling through publicly shared media. This has led 
to the rapid development of cryptographic techniques 
such as AES and public key architectures such as 
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) [1]. Although keys 
of sufficient length are strong against both brute force 
and factorization attacks they still suffer from 
weaknesses due to insecure key protection by user 
selected passwords. The limitations of passwords are 
well documented [2, 3]; they are simple and can be 
easily guessed or obtained using social engineering 
techniques. They are often written down and stored in 
an insecure location, can be shared between users, and 
cannot provide a guarantee of non-repudiation. 
Furthermore, most people tend to use the same 
password for a wide range of applications and as a 
result the compromise of one system leads to the 
compromise of many others. 
In recent years researchers have turned towards 
merging biometrics with cryptography as a means to 
improve overall security by eliminating the need for 
key storage using passwords. During the last decade 
biometrics has become commonly used for identifying 
individuals. The success of its application in user 
authentication has indicated that many advantages 
could be gained by incorporating biometrics with 
cryptography. A biometric is an inherent physical or 
behavioural characteristic of an individual such as their 
voice, face, fingerprint or keystroke dynamics. 
Biometrics, in contrast to passwords, cannot be 
forgotten, are difficult to copy or forge, impossible to 
share and offer more security then a common eight 
character password.  
The principal drawback of a biometric is that it is 
not precise like a password or cryptographic key. 
Limitations of acquisition technology and the inherent 
changes in the biometric (such as pose and expression 
for faces) and environmental conditions (such as 
lighting) lead to variations in each sample of the same 
biometric. For example, although an iris is considered 
to be the most accurate of biometrics, there can be up 
to 30% variation between two different images of the 
same iris [4].  It is the primary challenge of all 
biometric cryptosystems to overcome this variation 
whilst harnessing the advantages of biometrics in order 
to improve the security of encryption keys.  
Another challenge stems from the permanence of a 
biometric. Apart from physical damage, fingerprints or 
iris remain largely unchanged throughout a persons 
life. This is a desired property in most applications of 
biometrics but in cryptography this is a weakness. 
Cryptographic keys need to be (and they often are) 
revoked or changed both proactively as a measure to 
increase security and reactively as response to key 
compromise. Most proposed schemes ultimately come 
down to the protection of an existing cryptographic key 
with biometric information. While the existing key can 
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be changed the biometric used to secure it cannot and 
this shortcoming is often neglected.  
This paper discusses how keys can be generated 
using a biometric and demonstrates the technique using 
3D face images. It shows how a biometric based binary 
sequence (bio-key) can be generated by selecting bits 
from the binary representation of the output of a 
chaotic bispectral transform applied to the user 
biometric. The transform is designed to eliminate bit 
errors arising from similarity transformations of the 
biometric and yet be sensitive to small changes. The 
length of these bio-keys can be increased as desired 
and they can be changed (i.e. revoked) by altering the 
procedure. Due to the fuzzy nature of biometrics these 
bio-keys contain some bit errors and as such cannot be 
directly used as cryptographic keys. But an error 
correction method similar to those used by Monrose [5, 
6], Juels [7] and Hao [8] allows these biometric based 
sequences to be used in regenerating an existing 
cryptographic key exactly. Performance of the system 
is analyzed using false accept and false reject statistics 
and bit error distributions.  
The underlying bispectral transform, binary 
conversion and bit selection criteria have been 
previously discussed in detail in [9] where the 
transform was used to generate random numbers from 
3D face images but will be briefly described again for 
clarity in section 3. 
 
2. Background 
 
Most recent biometric cryptosystems can be 
grouped into two categories. The first category relies 
on Shamir’s secret share scheme [10]. This method is 
based on the use of polynomial interpolation to 
completely reproduce a polynomial given a small set of 
coordinate points (also known as shares) that lie on the 
polynomial. The cryptographic key can be hidden in 
this polynomial, either split up into the coefficients or 
as the constant term. The user’s biometric data is then 
used to determine which shares are used to reproduce 
the polynomial and recover the key. 
The first use of this technique was by Monrose et al. 
[5] and presented as a technique of password hardening 
based on keystroke dynamics. This was expanded upon 
later by the same investigators using voice features [6]. 
The method protects a key with a number of arbitrarily 
created shares, one share for each feature extracted 
from the user’s voice. These shares are placed in a two 
column lookup table. A threshold is applied to each of 
the user’s voice features and depending on the decision 
a share is selected from either the left or the right 
column of the lookup table. This method provided 60 
bits of security. Other research groups have since 
applied this method to other biometrics such as 
fingerprint [11, 12], face [13] and iris [8]. However, 
the majority of these methods, with the exception of 
Hao et al.[8] who can produce 140 bits, have at best 
only 88 bits of entropy. This is only marginally more 
than half of the entropy in a modern day 128-bit AES 
key that the schemes are intended to protect. 
Juels and Sudan [14] proposed their Fuzzy Vault 
scheme which also uses polynomial interpolation 
similar to Shamir’s secret share. But unlike the method 
proposed by Monrose, where biometric information is 
used to search the look-up table, this method uses 
biometric data to create the shares (coordinate points) 
themselves. Again, only a subset of the coordinate pairs 
are required to recreate the polynomial in order to 
obtain the key. A large number of chaff points, which 
are randomly generated points that do not lie on the 
polynomial, are also inserted into the stored template 
so an attacker without the biometric cannot generate 
the key. The use of polynomial coordinate points 
makes this method more suited to biometrics that suffer 
from incorrect ordering and erasures between 
acquisitions. 
Fuzzy Vaults have been used by a number of 
researchers in their implementations of biometric 
cryptography systems. Clancy et al. [15] used 
fingerprint data which demonstrated the feature order 
invariance of the Fuzzy Vault scheme. Reed-Solomon 
codes are used to aid in polynomial interpolation to 
recover the key. The system was shown to produce 69 
bits of complexity and simulated performance indicated 
a false reject rate (FRR) of 20-30% at a theoretical 
false accept rate (FAR) of 2-69. Uludag et al. [16] 
proposed a very similar method also using fingerprints 
which produced roughly 35 bits of security and 
empirical testing showed a FRR of 21% at 0% FAR. 
An identical fuzzy vault technique applied to 
handwritten signatures by Kholmatov and Yanikoglu 
[17] obtained FRR of 8.3% with FAR of 2.5%. 
In summary, most techniques can only generate 
short keys that are of insufficient length for modern 
cryptography protocols. Secondly, there is little or no 
discussion on how to handle  the event when a 
biometric is compromised and can longer be used to 
protect keys. High FRR also limits the use of these 
techniques. For certain applications and biometric 
modalities high FRR may, however, not be a serious 
problem. An example is faces from a video stream.. A 
false rejection rate of 95% will result in the need for 20 
frames on average before a frame is accepted and this 
is still a delay of less than a second at 25 frames per 
second. 
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3. Proposed method 
 
The transform employed by the system is an 
iterative, chaotic, bispectral one-way transform [18] 
that accepts a one-dimensional vector input and is used 
to produce a magnitude and angle pair per iteration. 
The transform incorporates similarity transformation 
invariance and shape sensitivity by design. This output 
can be converted to binary to form a very large bit 
matrix. These matrices are analyzed to locate feature 
bits suitable to be used as part of the bio-key using an 
entropy based criteria described in section 3.2.  
 
   Enrolment            Key regeneration 
 
Figure 1. Biometric cryptosystem flowchart 
 
3.1 The transform 
 
The transform requires a 1D input vectors and the 
Radon transform is used to convert a 2D image into a 
set of 1D projections. The resulting 1D vector 
produced at each rotation angle is fed into the 
bispectral transform. This vector is first normalized by 
the magnitude of the largest vector element; the mean 
is also removed. This normalised vector ( )(nxi ), 
where i denotes the i-th iteration) is then N-point 
Discrete Fourier Transformed to obtain )(kX i from 
which the magnitude spectrum ( ( )kX i ) is computed 
and the negative half of the frequency spectrum is 
discarded. 
To make the transform a one-way irreversible 
process the Fourier phase information is discarded. The 
sequence is then zero-padded to length N to produce a 
real valued sequence:  
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The imaginary part is set to zero. The Fourier 
Transform is applied to this sequence to produce the 
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represents complex conjugation. Unlike ( )kX i  the 
phase information is not discarded from the 
bispectrum. Therefore the bispectrum is complex 
valued with non-zero imaginary components and is 
sensitive to asymmetry. 
The bispectrum is then integrated along radial slices 
in the bifrequency plane to obtain: 
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Frequencies are normalized by one half of the sampling 
frequency (Nyquist frequency). The zero frequency 
component (or average signal) is eliminated from the 
above computation and a is the slope of the line in 
bifrequency ),( 21 kk space along which the integral is 
computed. The bispectrum is bilinearly interpolated so 
the integration can be computed using summation. The 
application and properties of this procedure for feature 
extraction have been described previously by Chandran 
and Elgar [18]. 
Iterating the procedure is necessary to produce bit-
sequences since more iterations increases the size of 
the output and the therefore enlarges the potential pool 
of bits [9]. The transform can be easily modified to 
become iterative by feeding back the integrated 
bispectrum as a complex valued input vector of length 
N for the next iteration. The normalisation step applied 
guarantees the system will be BIBO stable regardless 
of the number of iterations taken. 
After each iteration of the procedure, a measure of 
change is extracted by computing the complex valued 
inner product of the difference between the previous 
and present outputs with the previous output to obtain: 
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Where D represents the difference and can be 
represented as a Magnitude (M) and Phase (  ) pair 
(one pair per iteration) which can be used to form a 
Magnitude/Phase matrix. 
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3.2 Binary feature extraction 
 
These magnitude and angle matrices must then be 
binarised to allow for entropy calculation in order to 
determine desirability of the bits. The base 2 logarithm 
of the magnitude and angle values are stored as 64 bit 
floating point representation in the standard IEEE 
format [19]. These binary sequences are then stored in 
two matrices, one for the angle and the other for 
magnitude. 
Once the matrices are converted into binary form it 
is important that a definite quantitative process is 
developed to identify the suitable feature bits. To do 
this we must first determine what exactly a “desirable 
bit” is, then identify a statistical property that can be 
used to quantify this desirability. A method must also 
be developed that allows the bits to be ranked from the 
most desirable to the least. The use of statistical 
properties requires a training set data. For each user the 
training set can be logically split into two parts, an 
intra-class set (matrices generated from images of this 
user) and an extra-class set (matrices generated using 
images of all other  users).  
Bit probability seems like a natural statistical 
property that can be used to describe a bit’s 
desirability. However bit probability is is dual valued 
in this context; a bit probability of 0 or 1 represents the 
same level of constancy, likewise bit probabilities of 
0.49 or 0.51 represent the same level of randomness. 
Hence binary entropy is preferred. Entropy measures 
the amount of information contained in a bit on a scale 
from zero to one. The two extreme values of 0 and 1 
correspond to a constant bit (no information) and a 
completely random bit (one bit information), 
respectively.  The desirability of a bit as a feature and 
as part of the bio-key can be represented using its intra 
and extra class entropies. This criterion is represented 
in Table 1. 
Rarely will a bit fit perfectly into any of the above 
categories. Instead each bit can then be given a weight 
value between 0 and 1 depending on its usefulness 
allowing for the quantitative ranking of bits in order of 
their desirability as a feature bit. The weight (w) is 
calculated using a function based on both the intra and 
extra class entropies (ηintra  and ηextra) and can be 
broken up into two parts: 
 
1. Intra-class weight: from Table 1 it can be seen that 
ideal intra class entropy should be low and these bits 
should have a high weighting. 
w1 = 1 - ηintra 
 
2. Extra-class weight: should be high when extra 
class entropy is high. 
w2 = ηextra 
 
The overall weight of a bit is simply the product of the 
intra-class weight and the extra-class weight. 
The N highest weighted bits can then be used to 
form an N-bit bio-key, the locations of the N highest 
weighted bits are stored and used as a mask that can be 
applied to the bit matrix derived from future 
presentations of the biometric in order to extract the 
same N-bit bio-key. 
 
Table 1. Bit properties and the corresponding 
value for key generation 
 
 Low Intra 
Class Entropy 
High Intra Class 
Entropy 
High Extra 
Class 
Entropy 
 
Desirable 
 
Undesirable 
Low Extra 
Class 
Entropy 
 
Undesirable 
 
Undesirable 
 
The use of the Radon transform coupled with the 
iterative nature of the bispectral transform and the 
systematic process of bit extraction means that the 
same biometric can produce many different N-bit bio-
keys. This can be done by altering the number of 
rotations or iterations taken by the transform or by 
limiting where the bits that form the bio-key can come 
from (i.e. use only bits from even rotations, or odd 
iterations, or only from magnitude or any combination 
of). These parameters can be stored on a smartcard and 
even if the biometric is compromised the bio-key 
cannot be reproduced without these parameters. Even if 
both were to be lost a new bio-key can be issued using 
new parameters. The parameters act like a user chosen 
‘password’ that is written into the smart card but cannot 
be directly used by an attacker without possession of 
the card. 
 
3.3 Error correction 
 
Error correction is performed in a manner similar to 
Monrose [5] in that a two column look up table is used. 
But instead of Shamir’s secret share, Reed-Solomon 
(RS) codes are used to correct errors similar to Juels 
[7] and Hao [8]. The lookup table is created at 
enrolment by first taking the original k-bit 
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cryptographic key (korig) that needs to be secured. This 
is encoded with a RS coding scheme to create an N-bit 
sequence (Korig). The N-bit bio-key (Borig) is generated 
using the training images of the user. These two N-bit 
sequences (Korig and Borig) are combined to form a two 
column lookup table of N rows. These three parameters 
(korig, Korig and Borig) can then be discarded and only the 
lookup table is retained. Future acquisitions of the 
same biometric will produce a slightly modified bio-
key Bmod when applied to the lookup table will extract 
Kmod. The number of errors between Bmod and Borig will 
be same as Kmod and Korig and if this is within the 
decoding ability of the RS code used then Kmod can be 
successfully decoded to produce the original 
cryptographic key korig without error.  
 
 
Figure 2. Creation of lookup table during 
enrolment 
 
 
Figure 3. Regeneration of korig from using Bmod 
and lookup table 
 
This concept is illustrated in the example below 
assuming for simplicity that korig = 11, once encoded 
becomes Korig = 1101 and the user’s bio-key is Borig = 
1010 the resulting lookup table would be (where Bn is 
the n-th bit in Borig): 
 
 If Bn is 0 If Bn is 1 
n=1 0 1 
n=2 1 0 
n=3 1 0 
n=4 1 0 
 
As can be seen the bits in Korig (bolded) have been 
placed into the table depending on the corresponding 
bit in Borig. On a different presentation of the biometric 
by the same user a slightly altered bio-key Bmod = 1011 
is  produced and when applied to lookup table it will 
generate  Kmod = 1100. The one bit error in Bmod 
translates to a one bit in error in Kmod relative to Borig 
and Korig. Decoding of Kmod will correct this one bit 
error returning the original korig = 11. 
The use of the intermediate variable Kmod and the 
lookup table may seem like an unnecessary complexity 
when it seems possible to apply Reed-Solomon 
decoding directly on the bio-key (Borig) in order to 
produce an error free binary sequence suitable for use 
as a cryptographic key. But there are two main reasons 
for not using this simpler approach: 
 
1. Borig is a random arbitrary sequence and may be 
unsuitable for Reed-Solomon decoding.  The use of the 
lookup table can be seen as mapping a possibly 
undecodable sequence Borig to a decodable sequence 
Korig (Korig is always decodable since it is the output of 
a Reed-Solomon encoder). 
 
2. Directly generating a cryptographic key from the 
bio-key would mean the method is unable to protect 
already existing keys. The random arbitrary nature of 
Borig also means that a derived key may lack 
performance or security properties that an existing key 
would have. 
 
3.4 Security analysis 
 
To successfully unlock the cryptographic key (korig) 
an attacker would require:  
• The user biometric. 
• Lookup table  
• Transform parameters for bio-key 
The compromise of any one of these factors only is not 
enough to aid an attacker in the regeneration of korig. 
The user biometric cannot be used to generate the bio-
key without the stored parameters (contained either in a 
smartcard or central database store); alternatively the 
theft of the stored parameters alone is also of no help. 
Even if stored parameters are known to the attacker no 
information about korig can be extracted. The lookup 
table used to produce Kmod is derived through the 
combination of korig and Borig which are generated 
independently from two completely separate random 
processes, korig produced from any modern 
cryptographically secure random number generator and 
Borig produced from the bispectral transform whose 
outputs have been shown to pass standard National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) tests for 
statistical randomness [9]. 
With the knowledge of the lookup table the attacker 
could theoretically attempt to brute force Borig and 
since the error correction method used tolerates errors 
in Borig an attacker could successfully reproduce korig 
with any value Bmod within a certain Hamming distance 
of Borig , this exact distance is dependent on the RS 
coding scheme used. However Borig is a longer binary 
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sequence than korig itself and Hao [8] has shown that 
brute forcing Borig is no simpler than brute forcing korig 
directly. 
Brute forcing Borig is similar to exhaustively trying 
every possible combination of the lookup table and this 
is one of the advantages that using binary features 
affords compared to the original method by Monrose 
[5]. The original methods by Monrose used keystroke 
dynamics and voice and were severely limited by the 
amount of feature information contained in these 
biometric modalities. This lack of useable features 
restricts the size of lookup tables and this is the reason 
why earlier works by Monrose could only produce 16 
[5] and 60 bits [6] of security. The method described in 
this paper overcomes this by mapping the input 
biometric into a very large matrix of binary bits. 
However, correlations and dependencies must exist 
between these bits and not all carry useful feature 
information but the use of entropy based analysis is a 
systematic and quantitative method of identifying and 
extracting the ones that do.  
 
4. Implementation and results 
 
To test the method 3D images from the Face 
Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC) Database [20] 
were used. The images from this database contain 
many users under various expressions as shown in 
figure 2. A normalisation procedure is applied to each 
image by firstly rotating the image to align the eyes 
followed by image scaling to create uniform eye to eye 
distance of 70 pixels for all images. A circular mask is 
then applied to zero out pixels that do not lie in the 
face, this helps focus the transform on actual features 
rather than elements of the background. The image is 
smoothed using histogram equalization prior to being 
normalized so the non-masked pixels have mean zero 
and standard deviation of one. Inconsistent data points 
in the form of spikes and holes created due to sensor 
noise in acquisition equipment are eliminated using 
median filtering and linear interpolation, resulting in a 
final output image of size 150x130 pixels. A subset of 
this database containing 61 users with a total number of 
1417 images was used to train and test the system. The 
use of entropy as a means of identifying features 
requires training over a large number of images in 
order to get reliable estimates of entropy. So 19 images 
from each user were used to train with and the 
remainder used in testing, on average each user had 4 
testing images. 
The Radon transform is used to reduce each 2D 
image into 90 separate one-dimensional vectors 
obtained by taking 90 rotations of the image equally 
spaced between angles from 0 to 180. Each of these 1D 
vectors is passed through twenty five iterations of the 
bispectral transform producing 90 angle/magnitude 
matrices. These are then binarised to form an overall 
matrix containing 288,000 bits from which good 
feature bits can be identified and used to generate bio-
keys of various lengths.  
 
 
Figure 4. Expression changes present in 3D 
FRGC face images 
 
The table below shows the average variations 
contained in bio-keys of varying lengths, it also 
presents the false accept (FA) and false reject (FR) 
performance of a biometric cryptographic scheme that 
uses these bio-keys directly without applying error 
correction. As can be seen the false reject rates are 
quite high and are impractical for any application. 
However the average variation present in the bio-keys 
is about 6% and the vast majority of true user cases 
produce fewer than the average number of errors where 
as an impostor on average will produce a bio-key 
where half the number of bits are incorrect. This is the 
result of the entropic feature extraction criteria that 
seeks to minimize intra class variation while promoting 
random extra class behavior. These error patterns 
suggest that the use of error correction can significantly 
improve the FR performance.  
 
Table 2. Performance of bio-keys (B) of 
varying lengths 
 
N False 
Accept 
False 
Reject 
Mean 
bit error 
Impostor 
Mean bit 
error 
64 0.26% 66% 4.6 31.6 
128 0.08% 76% 8.2 62 
256 0.01% 88% 15.5 118 
512 0.0006% 95% 30 219 
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Figure 5. Bit error histograms for true users 
and impostors 
 
Bio-keys of length 240 bits were chosen and RS 
encoding scheme using a 4 bit codeword and 15 
codeword blocks were selected. To allow for varying 
length keys (korig) the RS encoding scheme is altered to 
correct a different number of blocks (T). 
 
Table 3. Performance of system for varying 
crypto-key (korig) lengths using 240 bit bio-key 
(Borig) 
 
T k  False 
Accept 
False 
Reject 
Mean 
bit 
error 
Impostor 
Mean bit 
error 
4 112 1.22% 28% 6 63 
3 144 0.75% 37% 7.3 68 
2 176 0.34% 47% 10 83 
1 208 0.09% 63% 13.8 98 
 
The use of error correction provides a tradeoff 
between false accept and false reject. Although the 
number of false rejects have been lowered (at the 
expense of false accepts) they still remain quite high. 
This is a limiting factor for most biometrics except for 
2D face video where multiple frames can be captured 
each second. False accepts are also relatively high but 
it is important to keep in mind that a false accept can 
only occur when the impostor has access to the genuine 
user’s stored parameters which can be kept on tamper 
proof smartcards. Performance is also expected to 
improve with the implementation of more rigorous 
error correction such as majority coding, which can be 
applied directly to the bio-keys prior to using the 
lookup table. Preliminary tests have shown this to 
lower both the false accept and false reject 
performance of the bio-key. With the false reject 
performance improving by as much as 14% and the 
mean bit error falling by as much as 50%. The 
incorporation of Hadamard coding, which is better 
suited to correcting single bit errors, prior to Reed-
Solomon coding is also expected to improve overall FR 
performance. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper illustrates a method of securing a 
cryptographic key of arbitrary length using a given 
biometric. Although other biometric based methods 
have been proposed that have superior FRR/FAR 
performance few can produce keys of this length. The 
method is also flexible, the bio-keys used to protect the 
cryptographic key can be changed and revoked and is a 
significant feature not possessed by other methods.  
The method can be modified to protect keys of 
increasing length by either increasing the size of bio-
keys through performing more rotations/iterations of 
the bispectral transform or by changing the RS 
encoding scheme used. Lastly, the method can 
theoretically be applied to any biometric as 
multidimensional biometrics can be reduced to one 
dimensional projections or feature vectors. 
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